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FUTCH V. MCALLISTER TOWING, INC.:
TRANSFORMING THE PUNITORY EFFECT OF A

BREACH OF THE EMPLOYEE DUTY OF
LOYALTY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In South Carolina, if employees breach their duty of loyalty, they may now
be able to demand compensation for services rendered to their employers
during the period they acted disloyally. Futch v. McAllister Towing, Inc.'
involved an employee's breach of the implied duty of loyalty to his employer.
In Futch the South Carolina Supreme Court specifically addressed the effect
that a breach of the duty of loyalty will have on an employee's ability to
receive compensation for services rendered during the course of employment.2
Prior to the decision in Futch, the general rule in South Carolina provided that
an agent could not recover any compensation for a period of employment
during which the agent acted disloyally to his principal
The South Carolina Supreme Court departed from this bright-line test in
Futch,opting instead for an alternative balancing test.4 This new balancing test
focuses upon the particular circumstances of the case, including factors such
as (1) the nature of the employment relationship, (2) the nature and extent of
the services rendered, (3) the loss or expense the employer experiences as a
result of the breach of duty, and (4) the benefit received by the employer during
the period the employee was disloyal.5 This Note analyzes this balancing test
in detail and addresses its effect on the duty of loyalty and a disloyal
employee's right to compensation in South Carolina, along with the relevant
public policy considerations surrounding this change.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Futch v. McAllister Towing, Inc.
The facts of Futch are somewhat unusual and unlikely to be duplicated.
The employee, Futch, was an eighty-eight year old, well-respected tugboat
captain who had worked in the ports of Charleston and Georgetown, South

1. 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999).
2. Id. at 604, 518 S.E.2d at 594.
3. Id. at 605, 518 S.E.2d at 594.
4. Id. at 607, 518 S.E.2d at 595.
5. Id. at 609, 518 S.E.2d at 596-97.
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Carolina since the 1960's.6 McAllisterTowing (McAllister) was headquartered
in New York, but conducted business in South Carolina.7 In 1981
Georgetown's only tugboat company ceased operations, and Futch personally
leased tugboats for six months to continue operations until McAllister took
over the defunct company's business s
During a discussion with McAllister in late 1992, Futch informed
McAllister that he had no desire to retire in the near future.9 After this
exchange, Futch believed his job would continue indefinitely." However, in
December of 1992, McAllister notified Futch that his job would terminate at
the end of 1993.11
In addition to the termination of his employment, Futch had reason to
believe that McAllister would cease operations in Georgetown. 2 He then began
discussing plans to start his own tugboat company with a coworker. 3 They
planned to compete directly with McAllister, and intentionally set their pricing4
structure fifteen percent lower than the rate McAllister charged customers.'
Additionally, Futch and his partner solicited customers as well as employees
of McAllister. 5 While secretly preparing to begin his new business, Futch
continued to perform his work for McAllister."6 In August of 1993, McAllister
learned of the plans for Futch's new business and immediately terminated
Futch's employment.' McAllister then refused to pay Futch the $4200 Futch
had earned in monthly commissions during July and August of 1993.18
At trial, the jury awarded Futch $4,200 for wages earned. 9 The judge then
trebled the damages and awarded Futch attorney's fees under the South
Carolina Payment of Wages Act.2"

6. Id. at 602-03, 518 S.E.2d at 592.
7. Id. at 601, 518 S.E.2d at 592.
8. Id. at 602, 518 S.E.2d at 592.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 602, 518 S.E.2d at 592-93.
11. Id. at 602, 518 S.E.2d at 593.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 602-03, 518 S.E.2d at 593.
16. Id. at 603, 518 S.E.2d at 593.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 604, 518 S.E.2d at 593. The jury only deliberated for sixteen minutes. Id.
Id. The South Carolina Wage Payment Act provides:
In case of any failure to pay wages due to an employee as
required by Section 41-10-40 or 41-10-50 the employee may
recover in a civil action an amount equal to three times the full
amount of the unpaid wages, plus costs and reasonable
attorney's fees as the court may allow. Any civil action for the
recovery of wages must be commenced within three years after
the wages become due.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-10-80(C) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals reversed the trial judge's decision and held the trial
court improperly deniedMcAllister's motion fora directedverdict.21The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reinstating both the
jury's verdict and the trial judge's award of treble damages and attorney fees. 22
The supreme court specifically rejected the court of appeals's use of a brightline rule requiring a disloyal agent or employee to forfeit all compensation
during the period in which the employee or agent was disloyal.' Instead, the
South Carolina Supreme Court introduced a new balancing test to govern the
disposition of a disloyal employee's claim for compensation.24 The possibility
of a disloyal employee being able to recover compensation for services
performed during a period of disloyal conduct may have a profound effect on
the South Carolina common law duty of loyalty owed by an employee.
B. An Employee's Duty ofLoyalty
In addition to any express duty that an employee agrees to undertake within
a contract for employment, the common law of South Carolina has historically
imposed an implied duty of loyalty owed by all employees.' The general duty
of loyalty stems from the belief that "[i]t is implicit in any contract for
employment that the employee shall remain faithful to the employer's interest
throughout the term of employment., 26 If an employee acts adversely to the
interest of the employer, the employee is deemed disloyal and discharge of that
employee is justified.27
The South Carolina Supreme Court has determined the nature ofa contract
for employment includes a promise by the employee, either by express
statement or mere implication, that "he or she will perform the work in a
diligent and reasonably skillful manner.' 2 Every employee has a duty to abide
by and carry out an employer's instructions and policies throughout the

21. Futch v. McAllister Towing, 328 S.C. 312,320,491 S.E.2d 577, 583 (CL App. 1997).
22. Futch, 335 S.C. at 612,518 S.E.2d at 598.
23. Id. at 607, 518 S.E.2d at 595.
24. Id.
25. See Young v. McKelvey, 286 S.C. 119, 122, 333 S.E.2d 566, 567 (1985); Berry v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 270 S.C. 489, 491,242 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1978); Lowndes Products,
Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 333, 191 S.E.2d 761, 767 (1972); see also Tory A. Weigand,
Employee Duty ofLoyalty and the DoctrineofForfeiture, B.B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 6.
26. Berry, 270 S.C. at 491, 242 S.E.2d at 552 (finding that an employee who worked for
employer's competitor while on sick leave breached the duty of loyalty owed to his employer).
27. Id.; see also Gussin v. Shockey, 725 F.Supp. 271,274 (D. Md. 1989), affd, 933 F.2d
1001 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that where a horse trader breached his duty of loyalty to his
employer, the fundamental duties of an agent include the duty not to put himself in a position
in which his own interests may conflict with the interests of the principal).
28. Young, 286 S.C. at 122, 333 S.E.2d at 567.
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employee's term of employment.29 Any actions that are adverse to the
employer's interests are disloyal. 0
An employee's duty ofloyalty may be breached when any of the following
events occur: (1) an employee competes with his current employer;3 (2) an
employee solicits the employer's customers or otherwise diverts the employer's
business;32 (3) an employee lures his coworkers or former coworkers away
from the employer to a competing business;33 (4) an employee fails to disclose
to the employer matters that are adverse to the employer and which impair the
employee's ability to fulfill her duty of loyalty;' (5) an employee takes an
undisclosed payment from a third party who is conducting business with the
employer;" or (6) an employee divulges an employer's secret or confidential
information to others not privy to the information.36
1.

Development of the Common Law Duty of Loyalty in South
Carolina

Three leading cases in South Carolina have aided the development of the
state's common law duty of loyalty owed to an employer. 7 The first case,
Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., involved a nineteen-year employee
(Berry) who took nineteen weeks of sick leave, and while on leave worked for
a direct competitor of Goodyear.38 Goodyear ultimately terminated Berry's
employment when he refused to produce a doctor's written confirmation of his
health problems.3 9 Berry filed suit attempting to recover severance pay for the
time he was on leave.' The court found Berry had breached his duty of loyalty
and that this breach constituted an abandonment of his employment contract.4'
Thus, the discharge was justified.4' Applying the bright-line rule, a breach of

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Berry, 270 S.C. at 491, 242 S.E.2d at 552.
32. Lowndes v. Products, Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. at 333, 191 S.E.2d at 767 (stating an
employee has a "duty not to do disloyal acts looking to future competition").
33. Id. at 337, 191 S.E.2d at 769.
34. EMPLOYEEDUTYOFLOYALTY: ASTATE-BY-STATESURVEY508-09 (Stewart S. Manela
et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY].
35. Ocean Forest Co. v. Woodside, 184 S.C. at 420, 192 S.E. at 443-44 (1937).
36. EMPLOYEE DuTY OF LOYALTY, supra note 34, at 509.
37. See Young v. McKelvey, 286 S.C. 119,333 S.E.2d 566 (1985); Berry v. Goodyear Tire
&Rubber, 270 S.C. 489,242 S.E.2d 551 (1978); Lowndes, 259 S.C. 322,191 S.E.2d 761 (1972);
see also EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY, supranote 34, at 511 (citing Berry,Lowndes, and Young
as "(t]hree leading South Carolina cases in this area of the law").
38. Berry, 270 S.C. at 490-91,242 S.E.2d at 552.
39. Id. at 490, 242 S.E.2d at 552.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 492, 242 S.E.2d at 553.
42. Id.
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the duty of loyalty meant that Berry was entitled to no compensation
whatsoever.43
Another important case in the evolution of South Carolina's employee duty
of loyalty is Lowndes Products, Inc. v. Brower." In Lowndes several
employees left their employment to begin a new business in direct competition
with their former employer, Lowndes. s The employees also solicited and
acquired some of Lowndes's key employees and customers. ' Lowndes alleged
that the employees misappropriated its trade secrets for the manufacture of
nonwoven textile fabric.47
Lowndes's argument failed because the court found that the company
failed to take proper and reasonable measures to protect its trade secrets.4"
However, the court did agree that the employees' actions were disloyal, and the
employer was entitled to recover all damages proximately resulting from their
wrongfiul conduct.49 The court also extended liability to certain third parties
involved in helping the employees of Lowndes establish the competing
business, stating that "[i]t is well recognized that a person who without
privilege knowingly causes an agent to abandon his duties, or otherwise aids
or assists him to violate a duty to his principal, is subject to tort liability to the
principal." 50 This decision not only broadened the duty of loyalty in South
Carolina, but also extended the duty to individuals outside ofthe employment
relationship.
Young v. McKelvey is the third major case impacting the evolution of South
Carolina's duty of loyalty. 51 Young sued his employer for compensation
allegedly due under his employment contract.5 2 The employment contract at
issue required sixty day's notice ofits termination by either party.53 Young was
discharged - only nineteen days after being hired for conducting a romantic
relationship with a subordinate employee expressly against company policy. 4
The court, citing Berry5 and Lowndes,56 ruled that an employee has a duty to
abide by and carry out his employer's instructions and policies. By acting in
violation of company policy, Young "wilfully disobeyed his employee's

43. Id.
44. 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
45. Id. at 325, 191 S.E.2d at 763.
46. Id. at 325, 335, 191 S.E.2d at 763, 768.
47. Id. at 325, 191 S.E.2d at 763.
48. Id. at 331, 191 S.E.2d at 766.
49. Id. at 335, 191 S.E.2d at 768. The court also held that the employees' other actions,
such as providing the employer with notice of the employees' resignation by mail many days
after the employees had quit their positions, were disloyal. Id at 334-35, 191 S.E.2d at 768.
50. Id. at 337, 191 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting 3 AM. JuR. 2D Agency § 290 (1986)).
51. 286 S.C. 119, 333 S.E.2d 566 (1985).
52. Id. at 120, 333 S.E.2d at 566.
53. Id. at 121, 333 S.E.2d at 567.
54. Id.
55. 270 S.C. at 491,242 S.E.2d at 552 (1978).
56. 259 S.C. at 767, 191 S.E.2d at 333 (1972).
57. Id. at 121,333 S.E.2d at 567.
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express instruction.""8 Young did not abide by his employer's instructions and
policies; therefore,
the court denied the employee's motion for summary
59
judgment.

2. Application ofthe Common Law to Futch
TheFutch court held that Futch's actions breached the duty of loyalty.60 He
solicited his employer's customers, hired away coworkers, and initiated a
competing business.6' Clearly, an employee cannot solicit current customers of
the employee's employer.62 Futch violated this well-established rule when,
during his employment, he asked McAllister's customers to commit to Futch's
new company." In addition, the duty of loyalty requires an employee to exert
his best effort for the benefit of his employer." Futch did work for the benefit
of his employer and performed his job well while making plans to compete
actively with McAllister. 6'
Though it is a well-established rule in South Carolina that an employee
cannot compete directly with his employer,66 an employee in South Carolina
is permitted take limited steps to initiate future plans to compete with his
employer.67 For example, submitting forms to create anew corporation is likely
to be deemed pretermination planning but not a breach of the duty of loyalty.6"
This line separating mere preparation from active competition may be difficult
to discern in some cases. In Futch's case, the court of appeals concluded that
his solicitation of McAllister's customers combined with other acts and plans
aimed at competing with McAllister crossed that line and constituted a breach
of the duty of loyalty.69

58. Young, 286 S.C. at 122, 333 S.E.2d at 567.
59. Id.
60. Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 558, 604, 518 S.E.2d 591,
594 (1999).
61. Futch,335 S.C. at 603, 518 S.E.2d at 593; see also Lovwndes Products, Inc. v. Brower,
259 S.C. 332,332-38, 191 S.E.2d 71,767-70 (1972) (finding that the employees, who solicited
their employer's customers while making plans to begin a competing textile company, were
guilty ofdisloyalty and owed the employer damages); Ocean Forest Co. v. Woodside, 184 S.C.
428, 442, 192 S.E. 413, 420 (1937) (holding that the employee was not entitled to his
commission because his job was to collect an outstanding debt for his employer, but he
converted the money for his own use).
62. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978).
63. Futch, 335 S.C. at 602,518 S.E.2d at 593.
64. MarylandMetals, 382 A.2d at 568.
65. Futch, 335 S.C. at 603, 518 S.E.2d at 593.
66. See generallyBerry v. Goodyear Tire&Rubber Co., 270 S.C. 489, 491-92, 242 S.E.2d
551,552-53 (1978).
67. Futch, 335 S.C. at 610, 518 S.E.2d at 597 (citing Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771
P.2d 486, 493 (Colo. 1989)).
68. Id.
69. Futch v. McAllister Towing, Inc., 328 S.C. 312, 319, 491 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Ct. App.
1997).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/14
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HI. ANALYSIS
A.

The Effect of Disloyalty on an Employee's Right to Receive
Compensation

The traditional rule in South Carolina is that an agent guilty of disloyalty
to his principal must forfeit all compensation earned during that period of
disloyalty.70 As the Restatement (Second) of Agency explains:
An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is
disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such
conduct constitutes a wilful and deliberate breach of his
contract of service, he is not entitled to compensation even
for properly performed services for which no compensation
is apportioned.7
The rule that a disloyal employee forfeits the right to receive compensation
is derived from the broader principle of contract law that "a party who violates
an agreement should not be permitted to recover under the contract."' It also
follows the rule of equity in which one who does not come with "clean hands"
cannot recover.73 Thus, because the employee has breached an implied contract
with her employer, she should not receive compensation.
This rigid rule gives courts little flexibility when deciding employee
disloyalty cases. Before Futch, South Carolina courts automatically denied the
employee all compensation earned during the period in which disloyal acts
were committed. The courts did not look to extenuating circumstances or
external factors to reach their decision.74
B. The Futch BalancingTest

70. See Futch,328 S.C. at 316, 491 S.E.2d at 579 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Ocean Forest Co.
v. Woodside, 184 S.C. 428,442, 192 S.E. 413,420 (1937)); Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 270 S.C. 489,492,242 S.E.2d 551,553 (1978) (finding that the employee, a tire-salesman

fired after working for a direct competitor, was not entitled to severance pay).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958).
72. Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 289 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Wis. 1980) (citing JOHN D.
CALAMARI &JOSEPHM. PERILLO, THELAWOFCONTRACTS, § 11-26 (2d ed. 1977) and 9 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017B (3d ed.
1967).
73. See Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S.C. 523, 532, 23 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1943)

(discussing the doctrine of "unclean hands," which precludes a plaintiff from recovering in
equity ifhe acted unfairly and to the prejudice of the defendant in a matter that is the subject of
the litigation).
74. Futch v. McAllister Towing, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 605, 518 S.E.2d 591, 594 (1999).
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Instead of relying on the common law bright-line rule of automatic
forfeiture, the Futch court invoked a balancing test. 75 The new test requires
several factors to be considered when determining whether an employee should
be denied all or part of compensation earned during a period of disloyalty. 76
Specifically, a court must look to (1) the nature of the employment relationship;
(2) the nature and extent ofthe employee's services and the employee's breach
of duty; (3) the expenses and inconvenience caused to the employer by the
employee's breach; and (4) the value to the employer of services properly
rendered by the employee.77
Prior to the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Futch, no South
Carolina court had addressed the issue ofwhether a disloyal agent or employee
78
should forfeit all or only a portion of compensation earned while disloyal.
However, other jurisdictions have chosen to adopt a balancing test similar to
the one pronounced in Futch.79 For example, in HartfordElevator v. Lauer"
the Wisconsin Supreme Court introduced a balancing test that includes the
same factors applied in Futch.8 ' That court explicitly rejected the per se rule
that an agent who is disloyal in the performance of his duties forfeits the right
to any compensation. 2 The court explained that under the new test, merely
proving an employee's disloyalty is no longer sufficient. 3 In order to recover
damages, an employer must also prove that the disloyalty had such an impact
on job performance that the employee would be unjustly enriched if allowed
to retain the compensation previously paid." Once an employer proves abreach
of loyalty, the burden shifts to the employee to produce mitigating
circumstances as a defense to his breach of loyalty."5 If the employee is

75. Id. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 598 ("[W]e reverse the Court of Appeals's application of a
bright-line rule requiring a disloyal agent or employee to forfeit all compensation, and adopt
instead the balancing approach ... ").
76. Futch, 335 S.C. at 609, 518 S.E.2d at 596 (citing Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771
P.2d 486, 497 (Colo. 1989)).
77. Futch, 335 S.C. at 609, 518 S.E.2d at 596-97.
78. Id. at 612, 518 S.E.2d at 598 ("The balancing approach we adopt today is a new
development in South Carolina employment law .... 2).
79. E.g., Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 289 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Wis. 1980); Chelsea
Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320, 326 (Mass. 1983).
80. 289 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. 1980).
81. Id. at287.
82. Id. ("[W]e do not adopt the rigid, mechanical rule urged by the employer that
compensation is automatically denied to the agent during the period in which he has committed
a wilful, and significant breach of duty of loyalty.").
83. HartfordElevator,289 N.W.2d at 287.
84. Id.
85. Id. The burden of proof standard applied in HarfordElevator does not appear to be
a part of the Futch balancing test. In Futch, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine
whether Futch had proven McAllister had breached Futch's employment contract by refusing
to pay his wages. Futch, 335 S.C. at 603-04, 518 S.E.2d at 593. If Futch proved the breach of
contract, the jury was to then determine whether McAllister had proven that Futch breached his
duty of loyalty and was therefore justified in withholding his wages. Id.
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successful, the employer's recovery of lost profits or previously paid
compensation may be reduced or defeated.8 6
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has also elected to eliminate the brightline rule of forfeiture. In Chelsea Industries,Inc. v. Gaffney the court stated
that unless the disloyal employee proves the value of his services, the employer
is entitled to recover the entire amount ofthe employee's compensation during
the period of disloyalty.88 This rule is somewhat different from Futch, but is
similar in that the employee is given the chance to prove he earned a right to
compensation. The employee has the burden to prove the fair value of his
services rendered to the employer.89
The goal of the balancing test is to avoid the unjust enrichment of either
party.9" An employer should not be placed in a better position than if the
employee had not breached the duty of loyalty. If the employer receives value
from the employee's work, he must compensate the employee for the value
received. 9' This theory also works in the reverse, and the employee must repay
any portion of his compensation that was in excess of the worth of his services
to the employer.92 If the employer does not compensate the employee for the
value the employer received, the employer is unjustly enriched because the
employer receives a windfall. The balancing test is applied to avoid this
situation, and thereby adequately prevents the unjust enrichment of either party.
C. PublicPolicy
The Futch balancing test was adopted because the court recognized the
conflicting policies at work in employment disloyalty cases: the integrity of the
employment relationship versus the promotion of free competition in the
marketplace.93 The policy underlying the duty of loyalty owed to an employer
is that "commercial competition must be conducted through honesty and fair
dealing."' A healthy employment relationship is fostered by honesty and fair

86. Id.
87. Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Mass. 1983).
88. Id. (holding that employees who began a competing business violated their fiduciary
duty and were not entitled to recover compensation because they did not prove the value oftheir
services); accordWalshv. Atlantic Research Assocs., 71 N.E.2d 580,585 (Mass. 1947) (holding
that an employer's right of recovery is limited to the amount of compensation paid during an
employee's disloyalty that is greater than the value of the employee's services to the employer).
89. Chelsea,449 N.E.2d at 327.
90. See Futch, 335 S.C. at 609, 518 S.E.2d at 596; HartfordElevator,289 N.W.2d at 287.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Futch,335 S.C. at 606,518 S.E.2d at 595 (citing Jet Courier Service, Inc. v. Mulei, 771
P.2d 486,493).
94. Jet Courier,771 P.2d at 492; see also Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564,

568 (Md. 1978) (finding that fairness dictates that an employee should not be permitted to take
advantage of his employer's trust in order to obtain an unfair advantage when competing with
that employer).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
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dealing.95 If employees are not loyal to their employers, our marketplace could
face severe instability. For example, employees could be induced to change
jobs or careers frequently, breeding only limited dedication to one's work.
Without any intention to remain in a job or career for a period of time, an
employee would not have much motivation for job advancement through hard
work. This instability could create low employee morale because an employee
may not be as satisfied with an atmosphere in which new co-workers are
constantly coming and going. An additional effect would be the increase of an
employer's costs for training new employees on a frequent basis.
The competing argument is that society, as a whole, has an interest in
"fostering free and vigorous competition in the economic sphere".96 An
important part of the employee's duty of loyalty is his duty not to enter into
competition with his employer's business. Yet, free competition is essential to
our economic development and to the individual rights of employees to run
their own businesses, change career paths, or work for higher salaries. All
employees should have the right to improve their socioeconomic status by
exercising a maximum degree of personal freedom and discretion in choosing
their individual employment options.9 7
Many jurisdictions have recognized the need to balance the necessity for
free competition in the marketplace and stability and integrity within an
employment relationship." The doctrine of "corporate opportunity" was
developed to reconcile the competing interests of society and an employer.99 It
is an offshoot of the general duty of loyalty owed by corporate officers,
directors, and upper-level managerial employees. ' Generally, the doctrine
provides that "if a business opportunity is presented to a corporate executive,
the officer cannot seize the opportunity for himself if: (a) the corporation is
financially able to undertake the opportunity; (b) the opportunity is within the
corporation's line of business; or (c) the corporation is interested in the
opportunity.'' ° However, if a business opportunity is presented that is not an

95. Jet Courier,771 P.2d at 492 (identifying the underlying policy consideration that
commercial competition must be conducted through honesty and fair dealing).
96. MarylandMetals, 382 A.2d at 568.
97. Id. at 568-69.
98. Jet Courier,771 P.2d at 492-93; MarylandMetals, 382 A.2d at 568; Futch, 335 S.C.
at 606, 518 S.E.2d at 595.
99. Phoenix Airline Serv., Inc. v. Metro Airlines, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 219,223 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (stating that "a corporate opportunity exists when a proposed activity is reasonably
incident to the corporation's present or prospective business and is one in which the corporation
has the capacity to engage") (quoting WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPS.

§ 861.1 (1986)).
100. Id.
101. Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957,963 (Del. 1980).
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opportunity in which the corporation has an actual or expectant interest, the
corporate officer is permitted to treat the opportunity as his own.1 2
If an employee takes advantage of a corporate opportunity or secretly
profits from a competitive activity, an employer may recover the lost value of
the opportunity or the lost profit. 3 The lost profit includes the compensation
the employer paid to the employee during the employee's period of
disloyalty."
The doctrine of corporate opportunity has not been discussed within any
South Carolina court opinions. Use ofthe doctrine could potentially provide an
alternative method to balance the need for both free competition and stability
within the employment atmosphere. Unlike the balancing test that provides a
great deal of uncertainty and unpredictability, the doctrine of corporate
opportunity would allow the court to employ a test that is not as restrictive as
the former bright-line test, yet it would eliminate some of the uncertainty
associated with the vague balancing test.
IV. CONCLUSION

The facts of the Futch case are unusual and unlikely to be replicated.
Futch, a vigorous eighty-eight year old, is not what one would imagine as the
stereotypical disloyal employee. Futch was portrayed as "saving" all of
Georgetown's port operations in 1981 by taking it upon himself to lease the
needed tugboats. 05 He claimed he had reason to believe his employer was
preparing to cease operations and therefore initiated plans to provide the
tugboat services himself."°6
Futch's individual appeal probably had a great impact on the jury and
created sympathy for Futch's situation. Individuals, serving as jurors, are most
likely employees themselves and may tend to rally behind the plight of another
employee. The desire to reach into the "deep pockets" of an out-of-state
employer may also arise from a fact situation such as that found in Futch.
The potential effect of the Futchbalancing test is difficult to predict. It may
lead to an increase in litigation due to confusion between employers and
employees about the effect of a breach of the duty of loyalty. The outcome of
a breach of loyalty case is now less predictable. No longer can an employer in
negotiations with a disloyal employee rely on the argument that the employee
will be unable to recover. Prior to Futch, an employee may not have been
willing to challenge the established bright-line test. However, if an employee
is faced with the possibility of attaining some of his wages earned during a
102. Id. at 963; see also PhoenixAirline,390 S.E.2d 219, 226 (Ct. App. Ga. 1990) (finding
that the employer has the burden of establishing that the employees were presented with a
corporate opportunity, then the burden shifts to the employee to prove the employee acted in
good faith in dealing with the opportunity and that no disloyalty occurred).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 (1958).
104. Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783 (N.J. 1999) (involving an employee who used
his employer's shipping information and truckers to aid his own business activities).
105. Futch, 335 S.C. at 602, 518 S.E.2d at 592-93.
106. Id.
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period of disloyalty, the employee is more likely to pursue litigation. An
increase in employment litigation will place a further strain on judicial
caseloads and create uncertainty about the application of the test in different
fact situations.
While it is possible that the balancing test is a more equitable solution to
the previous bright-line rule offorfeiture, more clarification is necessary for the
balancing test to be employed as an effective means of resolving breach of
loyalty disputes.
Stacy Gray
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